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COMMENTAIRES THE RESPONSE OF WAGES TO THE REMOVAL OF CONTROLS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE Frank Reid
From August 1971 to April 1974 a program of wage and price controls was in effect in the United States which was, in some respects, similar to the Canadian controls program. In both countries mandatory controls were implemented about five years following the termination of a voluntary controls policy. It is also interesting that in both countries controls were introduced in a surprise policy reversai by administrations which had taken strong political stands against controls. In view of the similar circumstances surrounding the implementation of controls and the basic similarity of the two économies, an examination of the U.S. expérience with controls seems worthwhile.
The basic format of the U.S. controls program is reviewed in Section 1. In Section 2 a model is developed to explain the rate of wage change and, in Section 3, the model is used to measure the effect of controls on the rate of wage change, both while controls are in force and when the controls are removed. The final section draws conclusions from the results of the empirical analysis.
AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. WAGE CONTROLS U.S. peacetime expérience with wage controls began with the announcement of a set of wage and price Guideposts in January 1962 in the Economie Report ofthe Président. The économie situation prior to their introduction was one in which unemployment was high and inflation was low (0.6% during 1961). The Guideposts were intended to reduce the inflationary impact of adopting an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. The basis of the policy was that wage increases were to be limited to the national rate of productivity growth, which in a subséquent report was specified as 3.2% per year. Price changes were to be related to unit costs, implying that priées would rise in industries with below average productivity growth, fall in industries with above average productivity growth rates, and resuit in a stable aggregate price level.
The Guideposts were not enforced through detailed régulations -instead the government relied on ad hoc intervention in "key" wage and price décisions. The best known example is Président Kennedy's dramatic confrontation with the steel industry in April 1962, but there were many other less well publicized cases of intervention by the government in price and wage décisions in which a wide variety of methods were used in an attempt to obtain compliance with the policy.
By the end of 1966, however, the inflation rate had risen to 3.3% and it was obvious that in this situation the government could not ask unions to settle for the 3.2% Guidepost. The administration was reluctant to set a new higher Guidepost and, in January 1967, the guidepost policy was essentially abandoned in the Council of Economie Advisors annual report.
The Economie Report of the Président in the following few years referred disparagingly to wage and price controls as a possible policy alternative. Strong statements were made to the effect that controls were ineffective, inéquitable, unworkable, and the least désirable of policy alternatives. On August 15, 1971 the Président announced a controls program in a surprise policy reversai. The légal authority for the program was provided in the Economie Stabilization Act of 1970 which had been passed by a Démocratie Congress, allegedly to embarrass a Republican Président who was ideologically opposed to controls.
Phase I of the controls program was an immédiate 90 day freeze on wages, priées and rents. Authority was delegated by the Président to the cabinet-level Cost of Living Council which then administered the program through the Office of Emergency Preparedness.
The wage control component of the program froze wages at the level in effect during the month prior to the announcement of the program. There was some reluctance to disallow deferred wage increases which were specified in contracts negotiated in good faith before the freeze. It was decided, however, that on the grounds of equity they must be disallowed -to do otherwise would be unfair to workers who were not covered by contracts. The Internai Revenue Service undertook over 85,000 spot checks during the freeze and reported over 90 percent compliance (U.S. Président, 1972, p. 84) .
Phase II of the program was implemented on November 15, 1971 with the objective of reducing inflation to 2-3% by the end of 1972. The guidelines established were that pay increases should be limited to 5-72% per year which, with a 3% productivity growth rate, was expected reduce inflation to 2-x k% per year.
Two new bodies were established to administer the program, the Pay Board and the Price Commission. The Pay Board was initially a tripartite board of 15 members, 5 each from business, labour and the public. In March 1972, however, four of the five labour members withdrew from the Board as a resuit of a disagreement over the Pacific longshoreman's seulement. Business représentation on the Board was then also reduced to maintain the labour-management balance.
For administrative purposes wage settlements were divided into three tiers. Tier 1, settlements affecting 5,000 or more workers (10% of ail employées) required prior approval by The Pay Board. Settlements in Tier 2, i.e. those affecting 1000 to 5000 employées (7% of ail employées) were required to be reported to the Pay Board ; and settlements in Tier 3, i.e. those affecting less than 1000 workers (83% of ail employées), required no reports but were subject to monitoring and spot checks.
In December 1971 the Economie Stabilization Act, which was scheduled to expire in April 1972, was extended to April 1973 by Congress and substantially amended. The policy which emerged was that generally, deferred increases negotiated prior to Phase I were to be allowed, and rétroactive payments were permitted for income lost during the Phase I freeze. There were numerous provisions for exceptions from the guideline. A three-year catchup provision was provided allowing increases up to 7% to workers who had averaged less than 7% in the past three years. Increases up to 7% would also be allowed in situations where a "tandem relationship" existed, or where deemed necessary by the Pay Board to attract or retain essential labour. There were no restrictions on the "working poor" (a term which the Courts interpreted to mean those earning less than $2.75 per hour), a group which included over 40 percent of the workers in the private nonfarm sector. Finally, ail workers in firms (except construction and health) with 60 or less employées were exempt from controls.
Phase III was implemented in January 1973. The Pay Board and the Price Commission ceased to operate and the program was one of voluntary restraint with some monitoring by the Cost of Living Council.
The voluntary restraint program of Phase III was found to be unsatisfactory and was replaced by Phase IV in August 1973, which reimposed the mandatory controls of Phase II. In an attempt to achieve a smooth transition to an uncontrolled economy and avoid an "explosion" of wages and priées at the end of the program, a policy of sector by sector decontrol was also implemented. Phase IV ended when the Economie Stabilization Act, which had been renewed for an additional year, expired on April 30, 1974.
THE WAGE EQUATION
In order to assess the effects of controls on the rate of wage change, it is necessary to hâve a model to predict what the rate of wage change would hâve been in the absence of controls. It is essential to employ such a model in assessing the effects of controls because, when controls are introduced other things are not held constant. It can be highly misleading to simply observe whether the rate of wage change rose or fell when controls were introduced and to attribute any change to controls. In many instances, though, policy discussions do not rise beyond this rather inadéquate level.
The rate of wage change is measured by the quarter-to-quarter percentage change in average hourly earnings, converted to an annual rate.
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The explanatory variables employed are the expected inflation rate, the job vacancy rate, the change in the job vacancy rate, and three seasonal dummy variables to capture seasonal bargaining patteras. The model was estimated by OLS using quarterly data over the 21 year period 1955-1 to 1975-IV, excluding the four Phases of controls.
The expected inflation variable was constructed using a weak form of the rational expectations hypothesis. More specifically, an expected inflation variable was constructed by regressing the current inflation rate on the inflation rates in the previous four quarters, with weights constrained to foliow a linear pattern.
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The job vacancy rate séries was constructed using the index of Help-Wanted Advertising published in The Conférence Board Statistical Bulletin. Maximum explanatory power was achieved using the current and one-period lagged value of the inverse of the job vacancy rate.
This spécification of the model avoids some of the more common statistical problems with wage équations. In particular, using the onequarter rather than the four-quarter change in the wage index as the dépendent variable avoids inducing autocorrélation; the fact that the expected inflation variable does not include the current inflation rate avoids simultaneous équation bias; and the use of the vacancy rate rather than the unemployment rate avoids the problem that the unemployment rate may not be a consistent measure of labour market conditions over time due to changes in the démographie structure of the labour force and the amount of structural unemployment in the economy.
The model performs reasonably well when assessed by the usual criteria. The coefficients are of the expected magnitude and statistically significant, there is no évidence of autocorrélation, the équation explains 57% of the variation in the dépendent variable, and an F-test does not show any structural instability over time. Table 1 summarizes the results of using the model to measure the effect of controls on the rate of wage change. For each period of controls the Table shows The four quarter distributed lag gave maximum explanatory power. F-tests indicated that at the .95 confidence level the linear constraint could not be rejected and higher order polynomials did not add significantly to explanatory power. due to controls. The table also displays an effectiveness coefficient (k) which expresses any réduction in the rate of wage change due to controls as a fraction of the différence between the announced guideline and the rate of increase which would hâve occurred without controls. The effectiveness coefficient can vary between zéro for a completely ineffective controls period, and unity for completely effective controls. In assessing any controls policy it is crucial to examine the behaviour of wages (and priées) when controls are removed in order to détermine if any restraining effect of controls is partially or totally offset by an "explosion" when controls are removed. An "explosion" of wages is defined to be an increase in the rate of wage change above the rate predicted, given the actual values of the explanatory variables. Thus, in order to measure the amount of any wage explosion, the wage équation is required to predict what would hâve occurred if controls had not been implemented. The final column of Table 1 présents the results of using a shift dummy to measure the amount of wage explosion which occurred following effective periods of controls.
THE RESPONSE OF WAGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND REMOVAL OF CONTROLS
Phase I, the 90 day freeze, was found, not surprisingly, to be the most effective period of controls (k = 0.6). This resulted in a réduction in the rate of increase of average hourly earnings by 4.0 percentage points during the period that the controls were in force. It was found, however, that when Phase I terminated an "explosion" in the rate of wage change occurred which almost completely offset the réduction during the control period. 
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Guideposts Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase IV and the Guideposts were both found to be substantially effective while in force (k = 0.4), reducing the rate of wage change by 3.9 and 1.8 percentage points respectively. However, Phase IV was followed by an explosion which offset most of the réduction during controls, whereas there was no évidence of such an explosion following the Guideposts.
During Phase II and Phase III there was no évidence of controls restraining the rate of wage change, even while the controls were in force. Thus it was not necessary to test for an explosion at the end of thèse periods.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. WAGE CONTROL PROGRAM
The empirical évidence presented above indicates substantial heterogeneity in the effect of controls on the rate of wage change in the five periods considered. In two of the periods there was no measurable effect, even while the controls were in force ; in two other periods the effects while the controls were in force were offset by an explosion when controls were removed ; and in the fifth case controls were effective while in force and there was no évidence of an explosion when the controls were removed. An attempt will now be made to provide an explanation for thèse divergent results.
In my view, the reason for the effectiveness of the Phase I controls while they were in force, and the explosion which followed, is simply that the freeze caused a postponement, until the end of the 90 day period, of any new settlements or deferred increase that otherwise would hâve occurred. This is obviously not the basis for a lasting policy of restraint. The policy makers did not, of course, intend for new contracts to be settled at the "0% guideline" during the freeze. The goal was simply to allow time for administrative machinery to be established and possibly to achieve some political shock effect. When the freeze ended ail the postponed increases took effect, in addition to the normal round of new settlements, producing the explosion.
The ineffectiveness of controls during Phase II is, I think, explained by the fact that most of the work force were eligible for exemptions of increases up to 7% (under the provisions for deferred increases, catchup, tandem relationships, and the working poor). Since the model predicts that the rate of wage change would hâve been just under 7% in the absence of controls, the lack of restraint due to the controls is understandable. Not much restraining effect can be expected when the effective guideline is above the rate of increase predicted without controls ! Phase III was also found to be ineffective, but for a différent reason. The lack of effectiveness resulted from an attempt to move from a program of mandatory restraint to one of voluntary restraint. It was, in effect, no restraint at ail.
The Guideposts period and Phase IV were both found to be substantially effective while in force (k = 0.4) ; however a wage explo-sion occurred following Phase IV but not following the Guideposts. What is the explanation for this différence?
An explanation suggested by économie theory is that the level of real wages in individual markets, and for the economy as a whole, is determined by basic économie factors such as marginal productivity, the degree of compétition in factor and product markets, etc. If controls displace any of thèse real magnitudes from their equilibrium levels, the equilibrium will be re-established by adjustments which occur when the controls are removed. Similarly, the level and rates of change of nominal priées and wages are determined by the money supply. If controls displace the equilibrium rates from that determined by monetary factors, the equilibrium will be re-established when controls are removed.
The theoretical model outlined in the previous paragraph yields prédictions about the occurrence of explosions which allow the hypothesis to be tested. The model predicts that an explosion of wages, but not priées, will occur following controls if the effect of controls is to reduce real wages, i.e. if controls were more effective in restraining wage increase than price increases. If controls reduce both wage and price inflation by corresponding amounts, i.e. there is no réduction of real wages, then controls are simply forcing unions to hold wage increases down to what they would hâve negotiated if they had been able to correctly anticipate actual inflation.
The model also predicts an explosion of both wages and priées will occur following controls if controls impose nominal rates of change of priées and wages which are inconsistent with basic monetary factors.
To test this hypothesis an équation was estimated in which the dépendent variable was the quarter-to-quarter percentage change in the real wage. The results indicated that during the Guideposts there was no significant réduction in the rate of change of real wages, i.e. both priées and wages were restrained. During Phase IV, however, there was a significant réduction in the rate of change of real wages of approximately the same amount as the réduction in the rate of change of money wages; i.e. there was no measurable restraint of priées. Thus the prédictions of the model are confirmed -a wage explosion following Phase IV was required to restore the equilibrium level of real wages, but an explosion did not occur following the Guideposts because real wages were not reduced.
In reviewing the évidence on the U.S. expérience with control and decontrol of wages, perhaps the most important lesson is that sweeping generalizations about the effectiveness of controls should be avoided. Various periods of controls can hâve quite différent effects and they should be analyzed accordingly.
LE CONTRÔLE ET LE DÉCONTRÔLE DES PRIX ET DES REVENUS: UN COMMENTAIRE

CLAUDE MONTMARQUETTE
La question des contrôles des prix et des revenus n'a cessé d'être commentée et débattue depuis la création, en 1975, de la Commission de lutte contre l'inflation (CLI) dont l'objectif était de limiter les augmentations de prix et de revenus au Canada. À la veille de l'abandon, ou du moins d'une redéfinition des contrôles, et alors que l'économie canadienne s'apprête à entrer dans la période post-contrôle, il me semble pertinent de rappeler et présenter certains arguments et facteurs économiques reliés à cette question. Non seulement certains de ces facteurs et arguments économiques me semblent avoir été négligés, mais ils m'apparaissent comme déterminants du contexte économique général dans lequel vont évoluer les négociations salariales collectives et les politiques de prix des entreprises dans la période post-contrôle.
Si on accepte de simplifier la question, on peut retenir que trois principaux éléments, extérieurs à l'économie canadienne, furent responsables de la poussée initiale inflationniste des années 1973-75. Le premier de ces éléments a été la pénurie de certains produits alimentaires résultant de plusieurs sécheresses d'importance à travers le monde. Même si cet élément ne fut que de courte durée, affectant surtout les consommateurs, il s'est avéré une force importante dans la montée initiale des prix et dans ce que l'on a appelé la «psychose de l'inflation». Le deuxième élément, et peut-être le principal, a été la fixation unilatérale du prix du pétrole par le cartel des pays producteurs (OPEP). Ce cartel a réussi, chacun le sait, à quadrupler le prix du pétrole. Ce phénomène ne pouvait être considéré comme temporaire et devait ultimement comporter un ajustement dans les prix relatifs et entraîner un transfert réel de ressources des pays consommateurs vers les pays * MONTMARQUETTE, C, directeur. Centre de recherche en développement économique, Université de Montréal. ** Je tiens à remercier le professeur Léonard Dudley de ses commentaires fort pertinents. Les erreurs que peut contenir ce texte demeurent par ailleurs ma seule responsabilité.
